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Abstract
Algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions
have recently been applied to a number of secu-
rity domains. However, many of the techniques
developed for compact representations of security
games do not extend to Bayesian security games,
which allow us to model uncertainty about the at-
tacker’s type. In this paper, we introduce a gen-
eral framework of catcher-evader games that can
capture Bayesian security games as well as other
game families of interest. We show that comput-
ing Stackelberg strategies is NP-hard, but give an
algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium that
performs well in experiments. We also prove that
the Nash equilibria of these games satisfy the inter-
changeability property, so that equilibrium selec-
tion is not an issue.
1 Introduction
Algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions have long
been of interest to AI researchers. In recent years, applica-
tions of these techniques to security have drawn particular at-
tention. These applications include airport security [12], the
assignment of Federal Air Marshals to flights [14], schedul-
ing Coast Guard patrols [1], scheduling patrols on transit sys-
tems [15], and the list goes on. Game-theoretic techniques
are natural in these domains because they involve parties with
competing interests (though the games are usually not zero-
sum), and the use of mixed (randomized) strategies to avoid
being predictable to one’s opponent is desirable.
These applications have typically used a Stackelberg
model where one player (the defender) commits to a
mixed strategy first and the other (the attacker) then op-
timally responds to this mixed strategy. Formally, the
defender (player 1) chooses a mixed strategy σ∗1 ∈
arg maxσ1 maxs2∈BR2(σ1) u1(σ1, s2),
1 where BR2(σ1) is the
∗The full version of this paper is available at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.01896. Dmytro contributed to this
paper while he was a Ph.D. student at Duke University.
1Generally, if the attacker is indifferent among multiple targets,
the defender can slightly modify her strategy to make any one of
these uniquely optimal; this is why ties for the attacker are broken
in favor of the defender.
set of best responses to σ1 for player 2 (i.e., the responses
that maximize player 2’s utility). This is in contrast to the
more standard solution concept of Nash equilibrium, where
both players play a mixed strategy in such a way that each
plays a best response to the other—that is, a pair (σ1, σ2) with
σ1 ∈ BR1(σ2) and σ2 ∈ BR2(σ1). Arguably, the Stackelberg
solution is well motivated in contexts where the attacker can
learn the defender’s strategy over time by repeated observa-
tion, whereas if this is not the case perhaps the Nash solution
is better motivated. It is known that under certain conditions
in security games, Stackelberg strategies are also Nash equi-
librium strategies [8].
Initial work in these domains modeled uncertainty over at-
tacker preferences using the formalism of Bayesian games,
assigning probabilities to different types of attackers. This
included the original work at the airport at Los Angeles [11].
However, subsequent research, which started to focus on
compact representations of security games, mostly did not
consider Bayesian games. In this paper, we introduce a more
general framework that can capture such Bayesian security
games, and study the computation of Stackelberg and Nash
solutions in them (which in such games generally do not co-
incide). Our framework can also model certain types of test
games in which a tester randomly chooses questions from a
fixed database of questions [9]. We show that computing a
Stackelberg strategy is strongly NP-hard, but give an algo-
rithm for computing Nash equilibria that combines and ex-
pands on earlier techniques in both security and test games.
While we have been unable to show that our algorithm is
guaranteed to require at most polynomially many iterations,
it requires few iterations in experiments.
More benefits of our framework are listed below: (1) Our
notation for Catcher-Evader2 games, once one becomes fa-
miliar with it, greatly simplifies analysis of those games, es-
pecially as it concerns utilities. For example, our notation
expresses the utility delta of a target, which is often the cru-
cial quantity, directly as d, rather than as a difference (e.g.,
uci − uui ). (2) Our additional parameters a, b, c allow richer
utility functions that security games did not capture previ-
2Note that these games are completely different from pursuit-
evasion (or cops-and-robbers) games [10; 3]. Those games involve
dynamically chasing another player on a graph. Our games, in con-
trast, occur in a single period, and concern the computation of an
optimal random assignment.
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ously. For example, targets may have different costs to defend
even if the attacker does not attack them. Previous security
game definitions always assumed no cost (or the same cost)
if the attacker does not attack. (3) It lets us swap the roles of
defenders and attackers. Therefore, we can also directly com-
pute the attacker’s strategy as well as the defender’s strategy,
an example of which is computing the tester’s strategy in test
games. (4) Its connection between security games and test
games brings enormous convenience for algorithm design.
Previously, separate algorithms had to be designed for them,
but now we can design a single algorithm for both. More-
over, we can potentially apply known algorithms for each of
these game families to the other. For example, the aforemen-
tioned Nash equilibria algorithm combines techniques for se-
curity games (progressively increasing defender or catcher
resources) and test games (using network flow to reallocate
attacker or evader resources). (5) Besides security games
and test games, it can also capture other interesting scenar-
ios where resources must be assigned to different targets by
two competing parties. For example, two companies, an in-
cumbent and an entrant, might be allocating capital to differ-
ent markets; the entrant may wish to evade the incumbent and
build up market share, while the incumbent wants to catch the
entrant to drive the latter out of business.
2 Notation
We model a Catcher-Evader game (CE game) as a game be-
tween one catcher and multiple evaders. Since we assume
that the evaders do not care about each other’s actions, this is
equivalent to a Bayesian game between a single-typed catcher
and an evader with multiple types. Also, as we will show in
section 3.3, the roles of catcher and evader can be swapped.
Hence, our model also captures games between one evader
and multiple catchers.
We represent a CE game by (N,Ψ, r, `, a, b, c, d), where
N = {0, 1, . . . , n} is the set of players and Ψ is the set of
sites (e.g., the targets in a security game or the questions in a
test game). We fix 0 ∈ N to be the catcher (e.g., the defender
in a security game), and N+ = {1, 2, . . . , n} to be the set
of evaders (e.g., the multiple types of attackers in a security
game). Player i ∈ N has available a total resource amount
of ri ∈ R≥0. For example, we might set ri = 1 to indi-
cate that i has only one resource, or we might set ri = 1/2
to indicate that, in a Bayesian game, a type i that appears
with probability 1/2 has only a single resource, and therefore
the expected number of resources that this type contributes
is 1/2. This resource amount can be split fractionally across
the sites, for example, 1/3 could be assigned to one site and
2/3 to another. (This would typically correspond to assign-
ing a single resource to the former site with probability 1/3.)
Player i can assign a resource amount of at most `i,ψ ∈ R to
site ψ ∈ Ψ. For example, we might set `i,ψ = 1 to indicate
that i can assign at most a single resource to ψ, or we might
set `i,ψ = 1/2 to indicate that, in a Bayesian game, a type i
that appears with probability 1/2 can assign at most a single
resource to ψ if he appears, and therefore his marginal con-
tribution of probability mass to ψ is at most 1/2. Generally,
ri ≤
∑
ψ∈Ψ `i,ψ so the player has to make a nontrivial deci-
sion about which site gets more of the resource amount and
which one gets less.
Finally, the utility is encoded by a, b, c, d as follows.
Let x be the strategy profile where xi,ψ is the resource
amount that player i puts on site ψ. For convenience,
we denote xΣ,ψ =
∑n
i=1 xi,ψ as the combined resource
amount that all n evaders put on site ψ. Then the utility is∑
ψ∈Ψ [(b0,ψ + d0,ψxΣ,ψ)x0,ψ + a0,ψxΣ,ψ + c0,ψ] for the
catcher and
∑
ψ∈Ψ [(bi,ψ + di,ψx0,ψ)xi,ψ + ai,ψx0,ψ + ci,ψ]
for evader i. Here, b is the base utility for a player to put
a resource at a site, and d is the utility change that results
from putting a resource at that site when the opponent puts
a resource there as well. Since c (constant utility) is not
affected by any player’s strategy, we can ignore it (or let
c = 0) without affecting our analysis of both Stackelberg
strategies and Nash equilibrium. Finally, a (for alternating
utility) is the utility that a player receives when the opponent
puts a resource at that site; the former player cannot affect
this. Hence, for Nash equilibrium (but not for Stackelberg
strategies), we can simply drop a (or let a = 0). We require∑
ψ∈Ψ xi,ψ = ri for feasibility, as well as d0,ψ > 0 and
di,ψ < 0 for i ∈ N+ so that the catcher wants to catch the
evader while the evader wants to evade.
For convenience, we define x−0,ψ = xΣ,ψ and x−i,ψ =
x0,ψ for i ∈ N+. Then, we define µi,ψ = (bi,ψ + di,ψ ·
x−i,ψ) as the per-resource utility of player i on site ψ. That
is, it is the increase in utility she experiences from putting
one more resource there. So, player i’s utility gained from
site ψ can be written as ui,ψ(x) = µi,ψxi,ψ + ai,ψx−i,ψ +
ci,ψ . In a best-response strategy, player i should have a utility
threshold θi such that (1) for all ψ with µi,ψ(x) > θi, the
player maximizes the resource amount it puts there (xi,ψ =
`i,ψ), and (2) for all ψ with µi,ψ(x) < θi, the player puts no
resource amount there (xi,ψ = 0). (There is no requirement
for the case µi,ψ(x) = θi.) The value of θi is not necessarily
unique, so for definiteness, let θ0 = maxψ∈Ψ:x0,ψ<`0,ψ µ0,ψ
and θi = minψ∈Ψ:xi,ψ>0 µi,ψ for i ∈ N+.
Incidentally, note that if we do not require d0,ψ > 0 and
di,ψ < 0 for i ∈ N+, then a, b, c, d can represent any util-
ity function of the form
∑
ψ∈Ψ f(xi,ψ, x−i,ψ) where f is a
quadratic polynomial without factors x2i,ψ or x
2
−i,ψ .
In Table 1, we summarize all symbols for reference.
3 Reducing Games to CE Games
In this section, we show how the framework of CE games
let us capture several game families studied previously in the
literature, namely security games and test games.
3.1 Security Games
A general definition of security games was given by [5]. That
work considered only a single attacker resource; an attacker
with multiple attacker resources was considered by [7]. More
generally still, we can consider a Bayesian game in which
there is uncertainty about the type of the attacker. (Some of
the earliest work in this line of research concerned Bayesian
games [11; 13], but the games were relatively small and so the
techniques did not exploit the structure of security games.)
Description
N Set of players {0, 1, . . . , n}
N+ Evaders {1, 2, . . . , n} (0 is the catcher)
Ψ Set of sites (e.g., targets in security games)
ri Resource of player i
`i,ψ Resource limit player i can put on site ψ
ai,ψ Alternating utility of player i on site ψ
bi,ψ Base utility of player i on site ψ
ci,ψ Constant utility of player i on site ψ
di,ψ Utility change (delta) of player i on site ψ
xi,ψ Amount of resource i puts on ψ (strategy)
xΣ,ψ Sum of all evaders’ resource on ψ
x−i,ψ Amount of resource i’s opponent puts on ψ
µi,ψ Per-resource utility of i on ψ: bi,ψ + di,ψx−i,ψ
ui,ψ Utility of i on ψ: µi,ψxi,ψ + ai,ψx−i,ψ + ci,ψ
θi Utility threshold of player i
Table 1: Symbols used for CE games.
Player Security Game CE Game
uci (t) u
u
i (t) ai,t bi,t ci,t di,t
Def (i = 0) 1 -10 -10 0 0 11
Att 1 (i = 1) -5 5 0 5 0 -10
Att 2 (i = 2) -9 10 0 10 0 -19
Table 2: Example of how a security game’s utility specifica-
tion for a target t is converted to a CE game’s utility spec-
ification for a site ψ = t. In this table, we let uc0(t) =
ucd(t), u
u
0 (t) = u
u
d(t) for convenience.
We now define multi-resource Bayesian security games and
show how to reduce them to CE games. Note that in our
definition, a resource is assigned to a single target.3
There are a defender and an attacker. The latter has un-
known type i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. An attacker of type i occurs with
probability pi. There arem targets t1, t2, . . . , tm. An attacker
of type i can attack ri distinct targets while the defender can
defend rd distinct targets. A player’s utility is the sum of its
utility over all targets. If an attacker of type i attacks an un-
defended target t, it obtains utility uui (t) (and the defender
obtains utility uud(t)). If it attacks a defended (covered) tar-
get t, it obtains utility uci (t) (and the defender obtains utility
ucd(t)). Both players obtain utility 0 from t if t is unattacked.
Now, we can reduce this to the following CE game
(N,Ψ, r′, a′, b′, c′ = 0, d′) (see Table 2 for an exam-
ple of utility reduction): N = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n},Ψ =
{t1, t2, . . . , tm}, r′0 = rd, r′i = piri (i ∈ N+), `′0,ψ =
1, `′i,ψ = pi (ψ ∈ Ψ, i ∈ N+), a′0,ψ = uud(ψ), b′0,ψ =
0, d′0,ψ = u
c
d(ψ) − uud(ψ), a′i,ψ = 0, b′i,ψ = uui (ψ), d′i,ψ =
uci (ψ)− uui (ψ) (i ∈ N+).
Note that in the original security game, r consists of nat-
ural numbers and a pure strategy would put either 0 or 1 re-
sources on each site. In the CE game, the strategy profile xi,ψ
corresponds to the marginal probability that player i puts a re-
source onψ. Because resources can only be assigned to single
targets, we can always use Birkhoff-von Neumann decompo-
sition [2] to generate a valid mixed strategy of the original
security game with these marginals (see also [6]).
3 Section 6 of [5] also allowed resources to be assigned to sched-
ules of multiple targets, which quickly leads to NP-hardness [6].
3.2 Testing Games
Testing games were recently studied by [9]. In that work,
only test takers that do not fail any questions pass the test;
therefore, it does not matter whether a test taker fails 1 ques-
tion or 100. In contrast, we consider a variant—arguably
more realistic—in which the losses and gains the players
experience are additive across questions. We call this vari-
ant “scored tests”, which captures cases like the GRE, the
TOEFL, and most course exams at school. It allows us to by-
pass the (co)NP-hardness results for computing the best test
strategies from [9]. On the other hand, the transformation to
a zero-sum game described in that paper no longer works in
this context.
Formally, a test game is a 2-player game between a tester
and a test taker. The tester is uncertain about the test taker’s
type i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, but she knows that a test taker of type
i occurs with probability pi. The tester has a pool of questions
Q, from which t questions will be chosen to form a test T ⊆
Q (|T | = t). For a test taker of type i, a given subset Hi ⊆ Q
of questions are hard and he will not be able to solve them
unless he memorizes their answers (or writes them on a cheat
sheet). However, he can memorize at most mθ questions, so
if the tester randomizes over the choice of T , there is a good
chance that most questions in T have not been memorized.
We denote the set of questions i chooses to memorized as
Mi ⊆ Q(|Mi| = mi)
So far, everything is identical to the games defined by [9].
Now we introduce a question score sq for each q ∈ Q. If
a test taker fails to solve q in the test, sq is deducted from
his score. Hence the test taker’s utility is ui(T,Mi) =
−∑q∈T∩Hi\Mi sq .4 We also introduce a weight wq for each
question, representing how important the tester thinks it is to
find out whether the test taker can solve q. This may or may
not be equal to sq . The tester’s utility is then uti(T,Mi) =
vi
∑
q∈T∩Hi\Mi wq . Here, vi denotes the tester’s assessment
of the importance of test taker type i. For example, it might
be more (or less) important to figure out the true score of a
bad test taker (with large Hi) than that of a good one. We re-
duce this game to the CE game (N,Ψ, r, a, b, c = 0, d) where
N = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n},Ψ = Q, r0 = t, ri = pivimi (i ∈
N+), `0,q = 1, `i,q = pivi (i ∈ N+, q ∈ Q = Ψ), a0,q =
0, b0,q = wq
∑
i:q∈Hi pivi, d0,q = −wq, ai,q = −sq for q ∈
Hi, ai,q = 0 for q /∈ Hi, bi,q = 0 (i ∈ N+), di,q =
sq/ri,q for q ∈ Hi, di,q = 0 for q /∈ Hi.
Similar to security games, the resulting strategy profile xi,q
denotes the marginal probability that a player puts q on the
test / memorizes q; again, the Birkhoff-von Neumann theo-
rem allows us to obtain a strategy with these marginals.
3.3 Swapping Roles
The reduction from test games has one issue: the utilities
change at rates d0 < 0, di > 0 (i ∈ N+) but CE games
require d0 > 0, di < 0 (i ∈ N+). In a sense, the tester is an
evader who wants to evade by asking questions that are not
memorized by the test taker; but as we have defined them, in
CE games, player 0 is a catcher.
4A constant
∑
q∈T sq can be added to ui(T,Mi) to obtain the
usual nonnegative test scores.
(a) An example of test game players’ utility
on a question q
test taker’s utility, tester’s utility don’t test q test q
don’t memorize q 0, 0 -5, 4
memorize q 0, 0 0, 0
(b) Swapping roles for the above example test game
Player ai,q bi,q ci,q di,q
test q:
x0,q = 1
Tester (i = 0) 0 4 0 -4
Test taker (i = 1) -5 0 0 5
test q:
x0,q = 0
Tester (i = 0) -4 -4 4 4
Test taker (i = 1) 5 5 -5 -5
Table 3: Example of a test game and role swapping.
We handle this by redefining player 0’s resources to their
opposites. That is, we focus on which questions she does not
test. Hence, the modified x′0,q will be the marginal probability
that she does not test q (i.e., q /∈ T ).
In general, we can swap roles between catchers and evaders
(i.e., negate d) by rewriting CE game (N,Ψ, r, a, b, c, d)
as CE game (N,Ψ, r′, a′, b′, c′, d′): r′0 = −r0 +∑
ψ∈Ψ `0,ψ, r
′
i = ri (i ∈ N+), `′i,ψ = `i,ψ (i ∈
N), a′0,ψ = a0,ψ + d0,ψ`0,ψ, c
′
0,ψ = c0,ψ + b0,ψ`0,ψ, b
′
0,ψ =
−b0,ψ, d′0,ψ = −d0,ψ, a′i,ψ = −ai,ψ, d′i,ψ = −di,ψ, b′i,ψ =
bi,ψ + di,ψ`0,ψ, c
′
i,ψ = ci,ψ + ai,ψ`0,ψ
The correctness of this transformation is the result of the
following equations, letting x′0,ψ = `0,ψ − x0,ψ (note x′i,ψ =
xi,ψ for i ∈ N+):[
(b′0,ψ + d
′
0,ψxΣ,ψ)x
′
0,ψ + a
′
0,ψxΣ,ψ + c
′
0,ψ
]
= [(b0,ψ + d0,ψxΣ,ψ)x0,ψ + a0,ψxΣ,ψ + c0,ψ][
(b′i,ψ + d
′
i,ψx
′
0,ψ)x
′
i,ψ + a
′
i,ψx
′
0,ψ + c
′
i,ψ
]
= [(bi,ψ + di,ψx0,ψ)xi,ψ + ai,ψx0,ψ + ci,ψ]
Hence, the utilities are exactly the same as in the original
game. As previously mentioned, c does not affect our game-
theoretic analysis. However, it is essential for establishing
these equations so we can swap roles. Of course, after the
transformation, we can freely drop c′. Table 3 shows an ex-
ample of a test game and how we swap roles in it.
4 Complexity of Stackelberg Strategies
Theorem 1. If there is only one evader who can put all re-
sources on any single site (∀ψ ∈ Ψ, `1,ψ ≥ r1), then catcher
Stackelberg strategies can be computed in polynomial time.
The proof of Theorem 1 uses a by now fairly standard lin-
ear program technique.
Proof. There exists an optimal solution where the evader will
assign all its resources to the same best-response site ψ∗. For
each such siteψ∗, we can write a linear program that produces
the optimal Stackelberg strategy under the constraint of ψ∗
being a best response; the best of these solutions overall will
be the Stackelberg strategy. (See also [4; 6].)
In contrast, it has been shown that computing Stackelberg
strategies in a multi-resource security game (even with only
a single type, i.e., non-Bayesian) is (weakly) NP-hard [7].
Hence, by our reduction of such security games to CE games,
even if the CE game has only one evader (n = 1), it is
(weakly) NP-hard to compute Stackelberg strategies if we al-
low `1,ψ < r1 (so the evader/attacker will put resources on
multiple sites).
Next, we show that even if `i,ψ ≥ ri for all i ≥ 1, it
is strongly NP-hard to compute Stackelberg strategies if we
allow n > 1. This corresponds to the case of a Bayesian
security game in which each attacker has only a single re-
source. Note that the initial LAX airport paper [11] assumed
a Bayesian security game with a single attacker resource. To
our best knowledge, no hardness result has been given for
computing Stackelberg strategies of such games. Also, unlike
the known weak NP-hardness result for multiple resources,
this rules out pseudopolynomial-time algorithms.
Theorem 2. Computing Stackelberg strategies in Bayesian
security games is strongly NP-hard even if each attacker type
has only a single resource. Consequently, computing Stackel-
berg strategies in a Catcher-Evader game is strongly NP-hard
(if n > 1), even if `i,ψ ≥ ri for all i ∈ N+. (This result is
tight in the sense that this problem is also in NP.)
Proof. The reduction is from Satisfiability. In a Satisfiability
instance, there are n boolean variables and m clauses. Each
clause includes a subset of the variables and/or their nega-
tions. The problem is to decide whether there is an assign-
ment of true/false values to the variables such that each clause
has at least one literal set to true. We reduce a Satisfiability
instance to a security game as follows.
There are 2n+ 2 targets:
(a) 2n targets corresponding to the variables and their nega-
tions. We will call these variable-targets. The defender gets
a utility of 0 if any of these targets is attacked, no matter if it
is defended or not.
(b) One punishment-target. The defender gets −∞ utility if
this target is attacked, no matter if it is defended or not.
(c) One bonus-target. The defender gets a utility of 1 if this
target is attacked, no matter if it is defended or not.
The defender has n resources. The attacker types will be
set up in such a way that if the Satisfiability instance has a
solution then the optimal defender strategy is to defend the
targets which correspond to the negative-valued literals with
probability 1, and the defender gets a utility of u∗ as a result.
(The value of u∗ will be defined below.) If the Satisfiabil-
ity instance has no solution then the defender’s Stackelberg
utility is necessarily below u∗.
There are 3n+m attacker types:
(a) 2n attacker types whose job is to count how many of
the variable-targets are covered with probability 1 (counting-
types). Each of these attacker types is interested in one
variable-target and the bonus-target. If the variable-target is
covered with probability 1 then the attacker (weakly) prefers
the bonus-target and the defender gets a utility of 1; other-
wise, the attacker prefers the variable-target and the defender
gets a utility of 0.
(b) n attacker types which make sure that for literals xi and
¬xi, no more than one corresponding target is covered with
probability 1 (paired types). Each of these attacker types is in-
terested in one pair of variable-targets and in the punishment-
target. If both variable-targets are defended with positive
probability then the attacker chooses the punishment target,
and the defender gets a utility of −∞. Otherwise, the at-
tacker (weakly) prefers the variable-target with 0 probability.
(c) m attacker types which check whether the clauses are sat-
isfied (clause-types). Each clause-type is interested in all tar-
gets corresponding to the variables in a clause and in the pun-
ishment target. If all the targets in the clause are defended
with positive probability (meaning their values are all false)
then the attacker chooses the punishment target and the de-
fender gets a utility of −∞. If there is any target defended
with probability 0 in the clause then the attacker (weakly)
prefers that target and the defender gets 0 (meaning the clause
is satisfied).
The probability of each type is 1/(3n+m). We claim that
the defender’s optimal utility is u∗ = n/(3n+m) if and only
if the Satisfiability instance has a solution.
(satisfiable ⇒ u∗ is feasible) The defender can defend,
with probability 1, the targets that correspond to the liter-
als set to false. All paired-types and clause-types will at-
tack variable-targets, from which the defender gets 0 utility.
Exactly n of the counting-types will attack the bonus target
(each giving the defender a utility of 1) and the remaining
n counting-types will attack variable-targets (each giving the
defender a utility of 0). Hence, the defender’s total utility will
be n/(3n+m).
(u∗ is feasible ⇒ satisfiable) Note that only the bonus-
target gives the defender positive utility, and only the
counting-types are interested in the bonus-target. For the de-
fender to get n/(3n + m) or more, there must be n or more
counting-types attacking the bonus target. That means there
must be n or more variable-targets defended with probability
1. Since the defender has only n resources, there must be ex-
actly n variable-targets defended with probability 1, and all
the other targets must be defended with probability 0. The
paired-types enforce that no two of those targets correspond
to a variable and its negation. The clause-types enforce that
each clause has at least one target defended with probabil-
ity 0. Hence, to get the Satisfiability solution, we can set to
true the variables corresponding to the targets defended with
probability 0.
5 Interchangeability of NE
We now move on to studying Nash equilibria. In general, a
downside of the Nash equilibrium concept is that Nash equi-
libria can fail interchangeability: if one player plays accord-
ing to one Nash equilibrium and the other according to an-
other, the result may not be a Nash equilibrium. However,
it has been shown that interchangeability of Nash equilibria
is guaranteed in security games and test games under certain
conditions [8; 7; 9]. We now show that this also holds for CE
games.
Lemma 1. For each site ψ, either x0,ψ is the same for all NE
or xΣ,ψ is the same for all NE.
Proof. We first show that the lemma is equivalent to (A) there
cannot be two NE x and x′ and some ψ such that x0,ψ 6= x′0,ψ
and xΣ,ψ 6= x′Σ,ψ .
It is straightforward to see that the lemma implies (A). Now
we prove that (A) implies the lemma. Suppose that there ex-
ists a site ψ that makes the lemma false. Then pick any NE
x. There must be two NEs x′, x′′ such that x0,ψ 6= x′0,ψ and
xΣ,ψ 6= x′′Σ,ψ . If xΣ,ψ 6= x′Σ,ψ or x0,ψ 6= x′′0,ψ , then (A) is
false. If not, x′Σ,ψ = xΣ,ψ 6= x′′Σ,ψ and x′′0,ψ = x0,ψ 6= x′0,ψ ,
then (A) is still false using x′ and x′′. This completes the
proof.
We now define 4 possible cases that would contradict (A):
−− : x′0,ψ < x0,ψ, x′Σ,ψ < xΣ,ψ
−+ : x′0,ψ < x0,ψ, x′Σ,ψ > xΣ,ψ
++ : x′0,ψ > x0,ψ, x
′
Σ,ψ > xΣ,ψ
+− : x′0,ψ > x0,ψ, x′Σ,ψ < xΣ,ψ
We prove that if any one of these 4 cases occurs, all 4 cases
must all occur (on some targets). This results in a contradic-
tion, because the−+ case implies θ′0 > θ0 while the +− case
implies θ′0 < θ0. Hence none of the cases can occur, and our
theorem holds.
Case −+ implying case ++ and case +− implying case
−− can be proved in the same way as before [7] because the
catcher is not Bayesian. Therefore, we focus on proving that
case −− implies case −+. (The proof of case ++ implying
case +− is symmetric.)
Assume that ψ1 is of case −−. Let ∆xi,ψ = x′i,ψ −
xi,ψ (i ∈ N+) and ∆xΣ,ψ = x′Σ,ψ−xΣ,ψ . Then ∆x0,ψ1 < 0
and ∆xΣ,ψ1 < 0. Let Ψ
− = {ψ |∆x0,ψ < 0,∆xΣ,ψ ≤ 0}.
We have
∑
ψ∈Ψ− ∆xΣ,ψ =
∑n
i=1
∑
ψ∈Ψ− ∆xi,ψ < 0
(because of ψ1). Then
∑
ψ∈Ψ− ∆xi,ψ < 0 must be true for
some i. Let Ψ+ = Ψ \Ψ−. We have∑ψ∈Ψ+ ∆xi,ψ > 0 be-
cause
∑
ψ∈Ψ ∆xi,ψ =
∑
ψ∈Ψ− ∆xi,ψ+
∑
ψ∈Ψ+ ∆xi,ψ = 0.
Therefore, there exist some ψ− ∈ Ψ− and ψ+ ∈ Ψ+ such
that ∆xi,ψ− < 0 and ∆xi,ψ+ > 0.
Note that ∆xi,ψ− < 0 implies θ′i > θi (θ
′
i ≥
µ′i,ψ− > µi,ψ− ≥ θi where the weak inequalities come from
∆xi,ψ− < 0 and the strict inequality comes from ∆x0,ψ− <
0). Then, we have µ′i,ψ+ ≥ θ′i > θi ≥ µi,ψ+ , where the weak
inequalities come from ∆xi,ψ+ > 0. From this it follows that
x′0,ψ+ < x0,ψ+ . This then implies ∆xΣ,ψ+ > 0 (otherwise
ψ+ ∈ Ψ−), which allows us to conclude that case −+ holds
for ψ+.
Theorem 3. The Nash equilibria (NE) of a Catcher-Evader
game are interchangeable. That is, if x and x′ are two Nash
equilibrium strategy profiles, then so is x′′ where x′′0,ψ = x0,ψ
and x′′i,ψ = x
′
i,ψ (i ∈ N+).
Proof. The proof is similar to the one given by [7] for inter-
changeability in (non-Bayesian) security games with multiple
attacker resources. Only the proof of Lemma 4 in that paper
needs to be modified to our Lemma 1. The remaining reason-
ing is unchanged.
6 Computing Nash Equilibrium
The interchangeability established in the previous section
provides good motivation for computing a Nash equilibrium
in this domain. In this section, we provide an algorithm for
doing so. The algorithm is significantly more involved than
earlier algorithms, notably requiring a min-cost-flow subrou-
tine. This is perhaps surprising as earlier algorithms—e.g.,
the one by [7] for computing a Nash equilibrium in non-
Bayesian security games with multiple attacker resources—
do not need to do so. However, in the next subsection,
we show it is possible to reduce the problem of finding a
minimum-cost fractional matching to our games, suggesting
that this complexity is inherent in the problem. We have been
unable to either give a polynomial upper bound on the num-
ber of iterations of our algorithm (each iteration takes poly-
nomial time), or any class of instances that results in super-
polynomially many iterations. We only give an exponential
upper bound. However, as we will show, in experiments few
iterations suffice.
6.1 Reducing from Min-Cost Matching
We show that computing an NE in CE games (even with
single-resource evaders, i.e., ∀i ∈ N+, `i,ψ ≥ ri) is as hard
as computing minimum-cost fractional5 matchings—a com-
mon type of flow problem—suggesting that we are unlikely to
find a linear-time algorithm. Some of the ideas in the reduc-
tion, in particular having costs in the graphs corresponding to
the logarithms of utility change rates d, will also appear in the
algorithm we present later.
Theorem 4. Computing a Nash equilibrium of a CE game
is as hard as computing a minimum-cost fractional matching
of a weighted bipartite graph. Specifically, if there is a Nash
equilibrium finding algorithm that runs in T (I) time, where
I is the input size of the CE game, then we can solve the
matching problem in T (O(I ′)) time, where I ′ is the input size
of the bipartite graph. So computing a NE is not possible in
linear time unless there is a linear algorithm for matching.
Proof. We reduce the matching instance to a CE game whose
NE can be straightforwardly translated back to an optimal so-
lution to the matching instance. The reduction takes linear
time, resulting in the bound in the theorem.
Let the matching instance be on a bipartite graph with ver-
tices U = {1, . . . , n} and V . Each vertex v has a capacity
κv , with
∑
u∈U κu =
∑
v∈V κv . Each edge (u, v) has a ca-
pacity κ(u, v) and a cost w(u, v). Our goal is to saturate all
the vertices’ capacities at minimum cost. Equivalently, this is
a flow problem where
∑
u∈U κu flow must be pushed across
the bipartite graph at minimum cost.
We construct a CE game (N,Ψ, r, a, b, c = 0, d) where
N = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} (so N+ = U ), Ψ = V , r0 = 1 and
ru = κu for all u ∈ U , `0,v = 1 and `u,v = κ(u, v) for all
u ∈ U and v ∈ V , bi,v = 0 for all i ∈ N, v ∈ V , d0,v = 1/κv
and du,v = −ew(u,v) for all u ∈ U and v ∈ V .
First, we note that the game has a feasible strategy for the
evaders if and only if the matching problem has a feasible
5Of course, network flow problems have an integrality
property—but not if the input is fractional, as we allow here.
solution. This is because a feasible strategy xu,v corresponds
exactly to a feasible matching solution.
Second, x0,v > 0 must hold for all v. Otherwise, because
bu,v = 0 and du,v < 0, all evaders will strictly prefer tar-
gets with x0,v = 0; but then the catcher would not be best-
responding, because b0,v = 0 and d0,v > 0.
Finally, we show that the NE x must constitute an opti-
mal solution to the matching problem. That is, if we let
W =
∑
u∈U,v∈V xu,vw(u, v) then W is the minimum cost
in the matching problem. Suppose not; then, when inter-
preting xu,v as a flow, in the residual graph of that flow, a
negative cycle exists. Let that cycle be u1 → v1 → u2 →
v2 → . . . → um → vm → u1 with
∑
1≤k≤m(w(uk, vk) −
w(uk+1, vk)) < 0, xuk,vk < κ(uk, vk), and xuk+1,vk > 0
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m (letting um+1 = u1). Recall that θu is
the per-resource utility threshold for evader u. So, µuk,vk =
x0,vkduk,vk ≤ θuk and µuk+1,vk = x0,vkduk+1,vk ≥ θuk+1 .
Equivalently,
x0,vk |duk+1,vk | ≤ |θuk+1 | and |θuk | ≤ x0,vk |duk,vk | because
du,v < 0. It then follows that
m∏
k=1
x0,vk |duk+1,vk | · |θuk | ≤
m∏
k=1
x0,vk |duk,vk | · |θuk+1 |
which implies
∏m
k=1 |duk+1,vk | ≤
∏m
k=1 |duk,vk | because
x0,v > 0 for all v and thus |θu| > 0 for all u ∈ U . Taking
the logarithm on both sides, we obtain
∑
1≤k≤m(w(uk, vk)−
w(uk+1, vk)) ≥ 0, contradicting the negative cycle assump-
tion
∑
1≤k≤m(w(uk, vk)− w(uk+1, vk)) < 0.
6.2 Algorithm
We now present our algorithm. The algorithm works by ini-
tializing the catcher’s resource amount to 0 and gradually in-
creasing it to r0, maintaining the equilibrium throughout. The
same high-level approach was used by an earlier paper [7] for
the case of a single attacker type (evader) with multiple re-
sources, obtaining an efficient algorithm there. However, the
case with multiple evaders is significantly more involved. The
(polynomial-time) algorithm given in [7] did not require any-
thing like a network-flow subroutine, whereas the reduction
in section 6.1 suggests that this is necessary when we have
multiple evaders. Our algorithm also incorporates ideas used
in the context of test games [9], specifically the binary search
and max-flow techniques used there.
We first introduce some notation. Let Bi = {ψ | µi,ψ =
θi} be the boundary sites of player i. Let B+i = {ψ ∈ Bi ∧
xi,ψ > 0} be evader i (i ∈ N+)’s positive boundary sites,
whose resource amount can be reduced. Let Bˆ0 = {ψ ∈
B0 ∧ x0,ψ < `0,ψ} be the catcher’s open boundary sites, to
which more resources could be assigned. Let the active edges
be A = {(i, ψ) | i ∈ N+, ψ ∈ Ψ, ψ ∈ Bi}.
The main algorithm is Algorithm 1. After initializing, the
algorithm repeatedly loops through Algorithms 2, 3, and 4,
which together provably (eventually) increase the catcher’s
(allocated) resource amount while maintaining equilibrium.
Algorithm 2 ensures that a “no negative cycle” property holds
by solving a min-cost flow problem (since the residual flow of
a min-cost flow cannot have a negative cycle). Here, the rela-
tionship between the evaders’ best responses and the min-cost
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Figure 1: Performance of Algorithm 1, and the size of the normal form, for randomly generated CE games.
flow’s “no negative cycle” property is similar to the reduc-
tion from min-cost matching that we gave earlier. Given that
no negative cycle remains, Algorithm 3 then attempts to in-
crease the catcher’s resource amount—that is, for each ψ it at-
tempts to increase x0,ψ—without breaking the evaders’ best-
response conditions. However, Algorithm 3 can still fail to
increase the catcher’s resource amount even without negative
cycles. If so, we call Algorithm 4, which will either allow the
next run of Algorithm 3 to strictly increase the catcher’s re-
source amount, or change the open boundary sites Bˆ0 (which
provably cannot happen too often). Specifically, if Algorithm
3 failed to increase the catcher’s resource amount, we have to
reroute evaders’ resources among their best-response sites, in
a way that strictly decreases the catcher’s utility threshold θ0.
Such rerouting must also maintain the catcher’s best-response
condition. For this we use max-flow and binary search: first,
we binary search on ∆ , the decrease in θ0; then, we calculate
each edge’s rerouting capacity using ∆, and see whether a
max-flow can saturate all capacities, thereby maintaining the
best-response condition.
Algorithm 1 Compute a Nash equilibrium of a given CE
game (N,Ψ, r, b, d) (a, c are ignored as discussed earlier).
1: xi,ψ ← 0 (∀i ∈ N,ψ ∈ Ψ) . Initialize
2: for i ∈ N+ do
. Construct an initial NE with 0 resources for the catcher,
by simply assigning evader i’s resources to the sites
with maximum bi,ψ . (Recall that µi,ψ = bi,ψ +
di,ψx−i,ψ and θi = maxψ:xi,ψ<`i,ψ µi,ψ , and currently
x−i,ψ = x0,ψ = 0.)
3: for ψ ∈ Ψ where µi,ψ = θi do
4: xi,ψ ← min(`i,ψ, ri −
∑
ψ∈Ψ xi,ψ)
5: end for
6: end for
7: while
∑
ψ∈Ψ x0,ψ < r0 do . Iteratively increase x0,ψ
8: Run Algorithm 2 (min-cost-flow)
9: Run Algorithm 3 to weakly increase x0,ψ for all ψ
10: Run Algorithm 4 (max-flow) if Algorithm 3 failed
11: end while
Algorithm 2 Given CE game (N,Ψ, r, b, d) and an NE x,
reallocate the evaders’ resources xi,ψ across active edges A
using min-cost flow. This procedure ensures that no negative
cycle exists among active edges in the residual graph of x.
NE is maintained as we only reallocate across A.
. Construct graph (V,E) with cost w and capacity κ
. σ and τ are the source and sink of our flow problem
1: V ← {σ} ∪N+ ∪Ψ ∪ {τ}
2: E ← {σ} ×N+ ∪A ∪Ψ× {τ}
3: Initialize w ← 0, κ← 0
4: w(i, ψ)← log(−di,ψ) (∀(i, ψ) ∈ A)
5: κ(i, ψ)← `i,ψ (∀(i, ψ) ∈ A)
6: κ(σ, i) =
∑
ψ:µi,ψ=θi
xi,ψ (∀i ∈ N+)
7: κ(ψ, τ) =
∑
i:µi,ψ=θi
xi,ψ (∀ψ ∈ Ψ)
. Reallocate according to the min-cost flow
8: f ← min-cost σ-τ flow in the graph constructed above
9: xi,ψ ← f(i, ψ) (∀(i, ψ) ∈ A)
10: return the reallocated x
Algorithm 3 We are given a CE game (N,Ψ, r, b, d), and an
NE x where no negative cycles exist among active edges A
in the residual graph. This procedure either strictly increases
some of the x0,ψ (maintaining NE), or fails.
. All the graph computations below are based on the
residual graph of the min-cost flow in Algorithm 2.
1: ψ∗ ← None
2: for ψ ∈ Bˆ0 do
3: Compute single-source shortest paths from ψ
4: Let dist(v) be the shortest distance from ψ to v
5: Ψreachable ← {ψ | dist(ψ) <∞}
6: Ψunincreasable ← Ψ \ Bˆ0
7: if Ψreachable ∩Ψunincreasable = ∅ then
8: ψ∗ ← ψ . dist is shortest path from ψ∗
9: break . Increase x0,ψ starting from ψ∗
10: end if
11: end for
12: if ψ∗ = None then
13: return failure
14: end if
. Increase x0,ψ at rate γψ
15: γψ ← e−dist(ψ) (∀ψ ∈ Ψ)
. Decrease threshold θi at rate γi
16: γi ← e−dist(i) (∀i ∈ N+)
17: ∆ = (r0 −
∑
ψ∈Ψ x0,ψ)/
∑
ψ∈Ψ γψ
18: for ψ ∈ Ψ do . Reduce max feasible increase ∆
19: if γψ > 0 then
20: ∆← min(∆, (`0,ψ − x0,ψ)/γψ)
21: end if
. Consider how much we can increase before an in-
active edge should become active
22: for i ∈ N+ where µi,ψ 6= θi do
23: ∆′ ← (µi,ψ − θi)/(γψ × (−di,ψ)− γi)
24: if ∆′ > 0 then
25: ∆← min(∆,∆′)
26: end if
27: end for
28: end for
29: x0,ψ ← x0,ψ + ∆ · γψ (∀ψ ∈ Ψ)
Algorithm 4 Given CE game (N,Ψ, r, b, d) and an NE x
resulting from a failed run of Algorithm 3, we reallocate
evader resources among active edges A using max flow. This
strictly decreases θ0.
1: ∆¯← minψ∈Ψ:θ0>µ0,ψ θ0 − µ0,ψ
2: for each value of ∆ in a binary search for the max ∆ ∈
[0, ∆¯] such that G (below) has a max flow saturating all
edges from source σ do
3: G← min-cost flow’s residual graph in Algorithm 2
4: Remove the edges connected to σ or τ in G
5: for ψ ∈ Ψ do
6: if ψ ∈ Bˆ0 then
7: Add edge (σ, ψ) to G
8: Capacity κ(σ, ψ)← ∆/d0,ψ
9: else
10: Add edge (ψ, τ) to G
11: if µ0,ψ ≥ θ0 then
12: Capacity κ(ψ, τ)←∞
13: else
14: κ(ψ, τ)← (θ0 −∆− µ0,ψ)/d0,ψ
15: end if
16: end if
17: end for
. Determine whether the max flow on G saturates all
edges from σ to see how to proceed with the binary
search
18: Run max flow on G
19: end for
20: f ← max σ-τ flow of G for max feasible ∆
. If f(ψ, i) > 0, then f(i, ψ) = −f(ψ, i)
21: xi,ψ ← xi,ψ + f(i, ψ) (∀(i, ψ) ∈ A)
Lemma 2. Algorithm 2 maintains Nash equilibrium without
changing µi,ψ or θi for any i ∈ N+ and ψ ∈ Ψ. As a result,
the active edges A are also unchanged.
Proof. Algorithm 2 only reallocates xi,ψ amongA, hence the
evaders necessarily continue to best respond. Both the orig-
inal flow and the min-cost flow are required to saturate all
edges (ψ, τ). Hence xΣ,ψ is unchanged for all ψ ∈ Ψ and the
catcher necessarily continues to best respond. Each evader
i’s µi,ψ is clearly unchanged as x0,ψ is untouched by Algo-
rithm 2. By the definition of θi = minψ:xi,ψ>0 µi,ψ , the set of
positive boundary sites B+i must be non-empty, which means∑
ψ∈Bi xi,ψ > 0. So no matter how we reallocate, some
ψ ∈ Bi must remain positive. Hence, θi is unchanged be-
cause the µi,ψ are unchanged.
Lemma 3. In Algorithm 3, the evaders’ thresholds θi (i ∈
N+) decrease at rate γi. That is, the algorithm decreases θi
by ∆ · γi.
Proof. Throughout this proof, we require i ∈ N+. We also
denote by µ0, θ0, A0, B0i , B
+0
i the values of µ, θ,A,Bi, B
+
i
before increasing x0,ψ .
Because by definition, θi = minψ:xi,ψ>0 µi,ψ , clearly θi is
unaffected by sites ψ for which µ0i,ψ < θ
0
i , because xi,ψ = 0
by the best-response property. For ψ where µ0i,ψ > θ
0
i , it
will not affect θi for small enough ∆ ≤ minψ:µ0i,ψ>θ0i (µ0i,ψ−
θ0i )/γψ .
Therefore, for small enough ∆, the threshold θi is
only affected by sites ψ where µ0i,ψ = θ
0
i , or equiv-
alently (i, ψ) ∈ A0. Thus, for small enough ∆:
θi = minψ∈B+0i µ
0
i,ψ + ∆ · γψ · di,ψ = θ0i + ∆ ·
minψ∈B+0i γψ · di,ψ = θ
0
i + ∆ · minψ∈B+0i e
−dist(ψ) ·
(−ew(i,ψ)) = θ0i −∆ ·maxψ∈B+0i e
−dist(ψ)+w(i,ψ) = θ0i −
∆ · e−minψ∈B+0i dist(ψ)−w(i,ψ) Note that ψ ∈ B+0i means
that a backward edge (ψ, i) exists in the residual graph with
weight −w(i, ψ). Those are the only edges that lead to i,
hence dist(i) = minψ∈B+0i dist(ψ) − w(i, ψ). Therefore,
θi = θ
0
i −∆ · e−dist(i) = θ0i −∆ ·γi for small enough ∆. All
that remains to show is that ∆ is in fact small enough. This
is so because line 25 of Algorithm 3 ensures that we stop de-
creasing before any ψ /∈ B+0i can affect θi. Hence the lemma
holds.
Lemma 4. After Algorithm 2, if Algorithm 3 successfully in-
creases x0,ψ , it maintains Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The catcher’s strategy remains a best response be-
cause Algorithm 3 does not change any evader’s strategy and
the catcher only increases x0,ψ for which µ0,ψ = θ0. Thus
we only have to check whether each evader’s strategy remains
a best response.
By Lemma 3 and the notation µ0, θ0, A0 defined in its
proof, evaders are best-responding if and only if:
(∀i ∈ N+, ψ ∈ Ψ : xi,ψ > 0)
µi,ψ = µ
0
i,ψ + ∆ · γψ · di,ψ ≥ θi = θ0i −∆ · γi
(∀i ∈ N+, ψ ∈ Ψ : xi,ψ < `i,ψ)
µi,ψ = µ
0
i,ψ + ∆ · γψ · di,ψ ≤ θi = θ0i −∆ · γi
For (i, ψ) /∈ A0, line 25 of Algorithm 3 maintains the con-
ditions above. Now consider (i, ψ) ∈ A0. There, we have
µ0i,ψ = θ
0
i , so we only need to check
(∀i ∈ N+, ψ ∈ Ψ : xi,ψ > 0) ∆ · γψ · di,ψ ≥ −∆ · γi
(∀i ∈ N+, ψ ∈ Ψ : xi,ψ < `i,ψ) ∆ · γψ · di,ψ ≤ −∆ · γi
If xi,ψ > 0, a backward edge (ψ, i) with weight −w(i, ψ)
exists in the residual graph. Hence dist(i) ≤ dist(ψ) −
w(i, ψ), which implies −e−(dist(ψ)−w(i,ψ)) ≥ −e−dist(i).
That is, γψdi,ψ ≥ −γi, and therefore ∆ · γψ · di,ψ ≥ −∆ · γi
because ∆ ≥ 0.
If xi,ψ < `i,ψ , a forward edge (i, ψ) with weight w(i, ψ)
exists in the residual graph. Hence dist(ψ) ≤ dist(i) +
w(i, ψ), which implies −e−(dist(ψ)−w(i,ψ)) ≤ −e−dist(i).
That is. γψdi,ψ ≤ −γi, and therefore ∆ · γψ · di,ψ ≤ −∆ · γi
because ∆ ≥ 0, completing the proof.
Lemma 5. If Algorithm 3 fails, then Algorithm 4 strictly de-
creases θ0 while maintaining Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If Algorithm 3 fails, then for each ψ ∈ Bˆ0, there must
be another site ψ′ ∈ Ψreachable ∩ Ψunincreasable. That is,
for each site ψ ∈ Bˆ0 to which the catcher could increase
resource assignment, there is a path in the residual graph that
goes from ψ to some site ψ′ ∈ Ψunincreasable to which the
catcher cannot increase resource assignment.
That site ψ′ is, in contrast, a good site for evaders: if
they put more resources there, the catcher cannot penalize
them (because the catcher cannot increase its resources there).
Formally, there are two cases for ψ′: 1) x0,ψ′ = `0,ψ′ ; 2)
x0,ψ′ < θ0. In the former case, evaders can increase their
resource assignment there as much as possible because the
catcher has hit the limit of what it can assign there. In the
latter case, evaders can increase until µ0,ψ′ meets θ0.
Therefore, for each ψ ∈ Bˆ0, evaders can move a positive
amount of resource from that site ψ to some ψ′ /∈ B0 using
the corresponding residual graph path. The evaders continue
to best-respond because the residual graph only includes ac-
tive edges A. The catcher’s best-response condition is main-
tained by decreasing µ0,ψ by the same positive amount ∆
(the number found by the binary search in Algorithm 4) for
each ψ ∈ Bˆ0 (saturating all edges leaving σ), and not letting
µ0,ψ (ψ ∈ Bˆ0) decrease below µ0,ψ′ (ψ′ /∈ Bˆ0) (line 14 of
Algorithm 4). Because µ0,ψ has strictly decreased for each
ψ ∈ Bˆ0 and has not become lower than any µ0,ψ′ (ψ′ /∈ Bˆ0),
θ0 must have strictly decreased (by ∆).
Lemma 6. After Algorithm 4, either a new site ψ that previ-
ously had µ0,ψ < θ0 now has µ0,ψ = θ0, or the next run of
Algorithm 3 will be successful.
Proof. Suppose that the next run of Algorithm 3 fails. Then
for each ψ ∈ Bˆ0, a path exists in the residual graph (after
the run of Algorithm 4) from ψ to some ψ′ /∈ Bˆ0, as ar-
gued in the proof of Lemma 5. Suppose, for the sake of
contradiction, that none of the edges entering τ were satu-
rated during the run of Algorithm 4 (for the value of ∆ re-
sulting from the binary search), i.e., (∀ψ′ /∈ Bˆ0), f(ψ, τ) <
κ(ψ, τ). Then, in Algorithm 4, we could have increased
∆ further, resulting in a contradiction. Therefore, there ex-
ists at least one ψ′ /∈ Bˆ0 for which the run of Algorithm
4 made it the case that f(ψ′, τ) = κ(ψ′, τ). For that ψ′,
the total amount of evader resource xΣ,ψ′ was increased by
κ(ψ′, τ) = (θ00 −∆− µ00,ψ′)/d0,ψ′ (where superscript 0 de-
notes the value prior to the run of Algorithm 4). It follows
that µ0,ψ = µ00,ψ + θ
0
0 − ∆ − µ00,ψ = θ00 − ∆ = θ0, while
µ00,ψ < θ
0
0 .
Lemma 7. Each site ψ enters Bˆ0 at most once; hence, Bˆ0
changes at most 2|Ψ| times.
Proof. Only Algorithm 4 can change µ0,ψ or θ0. That al-
gorithm ensures that µ0,ψ decreases at the same rate for all
ψ ∈ Bˆ0, and stops decreasing if a new ψ′ µ0,ψ′ < θ0 en-
ters Bˆ0. So a site ψ can only leave Bˆ0 by being saturated
(x0,ψ = `0,ψ). Since we never decrease x0,ψ during the algo-
rithm, saturated sites ψ can never enter Bˆ0 again.
Lemma 8. Algorithm 3 runs successfully at most 2|Ψ| ·3n|Ψ|
times.
Proof. By Lemma 7, we only have to argue that there are
at most 3n|Ψ| successful runs before Bˆ0 changes. Now we
assume that Bˆ0 remains unchanged and check how many runs
there can be.
We classify an edge (i, ψ) where i ∈ N+, ψ ∈ Ψ into 3
cases: either (1) superior µi,ψ > θi (above threshold), or (2)
inferior µi,ψ < θi (below threshold), or (3) active µi,ψ = θi
(on threshold).
Let φ be a vector of length n|Ψ| where each element φe ∈
{1, 2, 3} denotes edge e’s case number. We will show that φ
changes after each successful run, and it will not repeat if Bˆ0
remains unchanged. Hence the lemma holds.
We first show that for a fixed φ, Algorithm 4 always returns
the same x (assuming that Bˆ0 remains unchanged).
Recall that in Algorithm 4, we proved that if the final flow
saturates any edge (ψ′, τ) that enters sink τ , then ψ′ will
newly enter Bˆ0. Hence if Bˆ0 remains unchanged, we can
ignore the capacity of those edges entering τ . Also, with Bˆ0
fixed, the set of edges leaving source σ and their capacities
are fixed. Therefore, the resulting x of Algorithm 4 is solely
determined by the edges between N+ and Ψ, which is fixed
by φ.6
We then conclude that if there were two Algorithm 3 runs
that have the same resulting φ, then between those two runs,
there must be no Algorithm 4 run that has positive ∆ which
strictly decreases θ0. Otherwise, we would have two Algo-
rithm 4 runs (after those two Algorithm 3 runs) with the same
φ, where the latter run has strictly smaller θ0 (note that θ0
never increases), contradicting that the returning x of Algo-
rithm 4 is completely determined by φ.
Therefore, if there were two Algorithm 3 runs that result
in the same φ, all Algorithm 4 runs between those two runs
must do nothing (∆ = 0). Hence, xΣ,ψ is unchanged between
those two runs for allψ, because only Algorithm 4 can change
xΣ,ψ .
Now consider graph G1 which extends graph G in the
Algorithm 2 by assuming that all edges are active (A =
N+ × Ψ). That is, for each edge leaving source σ, its ca-
pacity is κ(σ, i) = ri; for each edge entering sink τ , its ca-
pacity is κ(ψ, τ) = xΣ,ψ; the weight and capacity of edge
(i, ψ) is w(i, ψ) = log(−di,ψ), κ(i, ψ) = `(i, ψ) for all
i ∈ N+, ψ ∈ Ψ.
6The residual graph might be different for the same φ, depend-
ing on what the min-cost flow is; but x is the additional max-flow
applied to the min-cost flow, so what really determines x is φ.
Then we consider the original set of active edges A and
make G2 by revising the following edges in G1: for each
edge e = (i, ψ) that is not active, set its weight w(i, ψ) =∞
if e is inferior, and w(i, ψ) = −∞ if e is superior.
Clearly, running min-cost flow on G2 would result in the
same x as running Algorithm 2 because we fix non-active
edges’ flow by setting their weights to∞ or −∞. Moreover,
for the same flow, the shortest path in the residual graph of
G2 is exactly the same as the residual graph of G. Hence
when we talk about flow or distance, they could refer to ei-
ther G or G2. But when we talk about the total cost of the
flow, we are referring to G1, as G2 has infinity cost edges
and G only has active edges. That is, the cost of a flow x is∑
i∈N+,ψ∈Ψ+ xi,ψ log(−di,ψ)
Each time that Algorithm 3 runs successfully but the Al-
gorithm 1 continues (r0 is not used up), some constraint of
line 23 in Algorithm 3 must be tight, which means that a
new edge (i, ψ) must be entering the active edge setA (other-
wise we will either continue increasing x0,ψ or change Bˆ0).
For that newly active edge, if xi,ψ = 0, then dist(ψ) >
dist(i) +w(i, ψ) must be true (recall that dist is the shortest
distance from ψ∗ in the residual graph) because: µi,ψ’s de-
crease rate γψ(−di,ψ) must be slower than θi’s decrease rate
γi. Similarly, if xi,ψ = `i,ψ , then dist(i) > dist(ψ)−w(i, ψ)
must be true. Hence by adding (i, ψ), either dist has to de-
crease or a negative cycle exists which leads to a decrease in
flow cost (w.r.t. G1).
Also note that dist and flow cost are completely deter-
mined by φ if xΣ,ψ is fixed for all ψ ∈ Ψ. Hence φ can-
not repeat since each φ change has either to either decrease
flow cost, or maintain the flow cost and decrease dist. This
completes our proof.
With this, we obtain an exponential upper bound on the
algorithm’s runtime. Because the algorithm only terminates
when the number of catcher resources has reached r0, and we
have shown that the algorithm maintains equilibrium through-
out, this also establishes the algorithm’s correctness.
Theorem 5. Algorithm 1 computes a Nash equilibrium of the
given CE game in 2|Ψ|+ 4|Ψ|3n|Ψ| iterations.
Proof. Because of Lemmas 2, 4, and 5, Nash equilibrium is
always maintained. So we only need to prove that the algo-
rithm stops after at most 2|Ψ| + 4|Ψ|3n|Ψ| iterations. We
have at most 2|Ψ|3n|Ψ| iterations where Algorithm 3 runs
successfully, by Lemma 8. Each failed iteration must either
be followed by a successful iteration, or Bˆ0 is changed (by
Lemma 6). Lemma 7 ensures that Bˆ0 can be changed at most
2|Ψ| times. So overall there can be at most 2 × 2|Ψ|3n|Ψ| +
2|Ψ| iterations.
6.3 Experiments
Although Theorem 5 only gives an exponential bound on the
number of iterations, the number of iterations in Algorithm
1 grows much more slowly—about linearly—in our exper-
iments, as shown in Figure 1(c). In our experiments, pa-
rameters r, b, and d are generated uniformly at random from
{1, . . . , 10} (or {−10, . . . ,−1}). Each instance of size n has
n evaders and n sites; for each n we solved 20 instances.
The running time per iteration is provably polynomial and
it grows about cubically as Figure 1(b) shows. That is consis-
tent with how the network flow subroutine (which is used in
each of our iterations) typically scales.
An alternative approach to solving for these Nash equilib-
ria would be to construct the normal form of the game and
use a standard NE-finding algorithm. This approach, how-
ever, is doomed regardless of the precise choice of algorithm,
because the size of the normal form blows up exponentially,
as shown in Figure 1(d).
Note that we implemented our algorithm completely in
Python (including the min-cost network flow subroutine).
Hence there is room to further improve the performance by
using C/C++, and/or some optimized network flow libraries.
7 Future Research
The obvious direction for future research is resolving whether
our algorithm in fact provably runs in polynomial time—and,
if not, whether there is another algorithm that does. The al-
gorithm’s success in experiments gives us hope that the an-
swer to at least one of these two questions is positive, but
we have not been able to decisively answer them. There are
several indications that the question is inherently difficult to
answer. The earlier algorithm for multiple attacker resources
in the non-Bayesian case and the proof of the polynomial
bound on its runtime [7] were already quite involved, and we
showed that the Bayesian case requires us to deal with addi-
tional challenging issues (Subsection “Reducing from Min-
Cost Matching”). Still, we believe that the importance of
solving Bayesian security games would justify the devotion
of further effort to resolving this question, as well as to ex-
tending these techniques to related problems.
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